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IMPROVING SEPARATE PROPERTY OR RETIRING
LIENS OR PAYING TAXES ON SEPARATE
PROPERTY WITH COMMUNITY FUNDS
By WILLIAM Q.

DE

FUNIAKt

Both at common law and under the European civil law, improvement
of realty is said to pass no form of title to or interest in the realty. The
most that can be claimed is compensation or reimbursement on behalf of
the one whose funds were used for such improvement.' It is to be noted,
however, that where one occupying a fiduciary relationship improperly
uses funds of another under his control to acquire property in the fiduciary's name or to improve the fiduciary's own property, in Anglo-American
jurisprudence courts of equity will impose a constructive trust or equitable
lien on such improved property in order to insure relief to the one whose
funds were so used.2 Indeed, to prevent the wrongdoer from profiting from
his own wrong, the recovery assured will not be confined merely to the
amount used, leaving the wrongdoer to profit from his use of the funds,
but profits made by him are constructively held in trust for the wronged
person. Thus, where the wrongdoer improves his own property with funds
of another, the amount recoverable is the enhanced value of his property
from the use of such funds. The property may be sold at the direction of
the equity court to bring about such recovery or, where property has been
bought with the funds, the property so bought may, at the option of the
wronged party, be turned over to him under the constructive trust theory.3
By present day community property principles in this country, the community property is owned equally and presently by both spouses.4 Where
one spouse manages such community property, such spouse is considered
to occupy a fiduciary or trust relationship to the other spouse as to the half
of the community property belonging to the latter spouse.' Accordingly, it
should certainly follow that where the managing spouse uses the community property or funds to improve his or her own separate property, the
t Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. LL.B. 1924, University of
Virginia; LL.M. 1947, University of San Francisco. Member, Kentucky and California State
Bars.
1
See Shaw v. Bernal, 163 Cal. 262, 124 Pac. 1012 (1912) ; Dunn v. MulIan, 211 Cal. 583,
296 Pac. 604, 77 A.L.R. 1015 (1931) ; also Peck v. Brummagim, 31 Cal. 440, 89 Am. Dec. 195
(1866).
2 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 492 (1946) ; 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 514.2 (2d ed. 1956).
3 See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 201.
4 See DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 93 (1943).
5 Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 443, 205 P.2d 402 (1949).
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same principles outlined above should be applicable.8 Thus, where a husband having the management of community funds uses them to improve
his own separate property without the wife's knowledge or consent, the improvements attached to his realty are also his separate property, whether
one judges by civil law or common law standards, but certainly with a right
of reimbursement or compensation to the wife as to her interest in the funds
so used.7 And this reimbursement should be and certainly is in California
based on the enhancement in value of the husband's separate property
through the use of such community funds.' Equitable principles should also
allow of imposing an equitable lien or constructive trust upon the property
of the husband and this view is followed in some jurisdictions, notably in
the state of Washington.9
When we turn to the California cases, we find no specific reference to
any matter of an equitable lien. The Supreme Court decisions have stressed
the fact that the improvements become separate property of the husband
but with a right of reimbursement in the wife, based on the enhancement
in value of the separate property through the use of the community funds."0
On the other hand, many lower court decisions, both of trial courts and District Courts of Appeal evidently disregard this language of the Supreme
Court and frequently treat the improvement as being community property
and upon division of the community property on divorce have awarded such
improvements to the wife as being her share of the community property."
This apparent conflict between the Supreme Court and the District Courts
of Appeal may be reconciled, perhaps, if we consider that the latter courts
are applying equitable principles to recognize an equitable lien or constructive trust in or upon the husband's separate property by reason of his
breach of his fiduciary obligations. Incidentally, the same views will be
found where the situation is one involving the use of community funds to
pay taxes or assessments on the husband's separate property or to retire
liens or encumbrances upon it.'
While the remarks immediately foregoing have had reference to the use
6 For a constructive fraud upon the wife upon such use by the husband, see Dunn v.
Mullan, supra note 1.
7
Dunn v. Mullan and Shaw v. Bernal, supranote 1; Provost v. Provost, 102 CalApp. 775,
283 Pac. 842 (1929).
8

See Provost v. Provost, supra note 7; also Dunn v. Mullan, supra note 1.

9 Conley v. Moe, 7 Wash. 2d 355, 110 P.2d 172, 133 A.L.R. 1089 (1941) ; Jones v. Davis,
15 Wash. 2d 567, 131 P.2d 433 (1942).

30 This view is expressed by Dunn v. Mullan and Shaw v. Bernal, supra note 1.
"1See, e.g, Long v. Long, 88 Cal. App. 2d 544, 199 P.2d 47 (1948), in the second district,
wherein the court seems not fully cognizant of the language of the same district in the earlier
case of Provost v. Provost, supra note 7.
12 See, e.g., Estate of Turner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 576, 96 P.2d 363 (1939).
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by the husband of community funds to improve his separate property, this
has been because most of the cases have dealt with management by the
husband. Logically, the same results should be reached where the wife is
the manager of the community funds and uses them to improve her own
separate property or to pay off taxes or liens on such property. Other decisions relating to the obligations and liabilities of a wife who is manager
make this an obvious conclusion.'3
However, returning to the fact that none of the California cases actually hold that an equitable lien, in those words, exists, as do the Washington
courts, the language of the Supreme Court in Dunn v. Mullan that the act
of the husband constitutes a constructive fraud upon the wife certainly
indicates that equitable principles are being applied.' 4 It would add materially to our understanding of the California situation if the courts distin-5
guished between law and equity in their discussions of the above matters.1
Where a husband owning separate property or separate income does
use funds to improve his separate property, some jurisdictions apply the
presumption that he used his own separate funds therefor, rather than community funds.'" This presumption is rebuttable by showing his use of
community funds.17 But in California it has been held that there is no
presumption that the funds or property used by a husband to improve his
separate property is his separate property or funds rather than community
and the most that can be said is that its source is doubtful.', Of course, in
either situation the wife would have the burden of proving the use by the
husband of community funds without her knowledge or consent, with the
distinction that in California she does not have a presumption to overcome.
The question is of some importance as to the amount of the recovery.
Is the recovery to be based merely on the amount of the community property used or is it to be based on the value added to the separate property by
reason of the improvements made with the community property or funds?' 9
As already indicated, in California the rule is that the right to reimbursement, where existent, is to the extent of the value added to the separate
property by the improvements."0 Of course, where community funds are
13 According to Odone v. Marzocchi, 34 Cal. 2d 431, 211 P.2d 297 (1949), where the wife
is the manager of the community property she owes the same duties to the husband and has
the same obligations to the husband as he has with respect to her when the husband is the
manager.
14 Supra note 1.
15 For application of principles of estoppel, see 10 CAL. JuR. 2D, Community Property § 38.
10 Jones v. Davis, 15 Wash. 2d 567, 131 P.2d 433 (1942).
17 Ibid.
18 Seligman v. Seligman, 85 Cal. App. 683, 259 Pac. 984 (1927).
19 See DE FuNiAK, PaRNcnm'ns OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 73 (1943) ; and cases collected
in 77 A.L.R. 1021.
20 Dunn v. Mullan, supra note 1; Provost v. Provost, supra note 7.
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used to pay taxes or remove liens on separate property, recovery is necesV '
sarily based on the actual amount of community funds used.
Whatever measure of value is used, a further question develops. Is the
recovery to be actually on behalf of the community, returning to the community the full amount that the community is entitled to, or is the recovery
limited to half thereof, in favor merely of the plaintiff spouse? Consideration of the right of reimbursement usually comes up on dissolution of the
marriage by death or divorce, where it may be necessary only to see that
the wronged spouse receives the share belonging to her, or to him where
it might be the husband. Usually the wife has sued only for half, even in
situations where there has only so far been a separation without as yet any
legal decree.2" In one case, however, there was a recovery by a wife based
on the whole amount of the enhancement in value rather than for half.
There the husband had died intestate, in which situation the wife was entitled not only to her half as owner thereof but also to the husband's half
by descent 23
In many of the community property states, where a husband managing
community funds uses such funds to improve separate property of the wife,
the same rule prevails where the husband improves his own separate property. In other words, there would be a right of reimbursement in the husband or in the community through the husband.' In Washington, there
would be the same equitable lien existent as where the husband improves
his own separate property.2 But in California and in the states which
follow the California view,2' it is presumed that the husband intended to
make a gift to the wife of his interest in such community funds. In the
absence of any agreement to the contrary, the title to the improvements
follow the title to the property improved and is in the wife. Of course, the
presumption in favor of a gift by the husband to the wife may be rebutted.
If rebutted successfully there is the right to reimbursement to the extent
of the value added by the improvements.
21 Estate of Turner, supra note 12.
22 The various California cases cited in the preceding notes illustrate this. It is to be noticed
that Dunn v. Mullan, spra note 1, declares that a suit to quiet title is the correct remedy to
use, since it is sought to recover a sum of money by way of reimbursement.
23 Estate of Turner, supranote 12.
24 See SpE, LAW or M TA=AL
RI:rTS IiN TzxAs § 432 (3d ed.); Dv FumAx, Pa NLcs
or Co

u-uNrx

PROPmET" §§ 73, 142 (1943).

2 Conley v. Moe, supra note 9.
2
6Dunn v. Mullan, supra note 1; DE FuNIx, PRmciLs oF Commmn PRoPER r

§ 142

(1943).
27 Bank of Orofino v. Wellman, 26 Idaho 425, 143 Pac. 1149 (1914); Shovlain v. Shovlain,
.... Idaho....., 305 P.2d 737 (1957); Lombardi v. Lombardi, 44 Nev. 314, 195 Pac. 93 (1921).
28 For an agreement between spouses that an improvement is not to become the property
of the spouse to whose property it is affixed, see Shaw v. Bernal, supra note 1; Wheeland v.

Rodgers, 20 Cal. 2d 218, 124 P.2d 816 (1942).
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It may be noted that in California the rule would be the same where
the husband used his own separate funds to improve the wife's separate
property, that is, that it is presumed that he intended to make a gift to the
wife of such amount.2"
It is interesting to speculate on what would be the result in California
where the wife is managing the community property and uses it to make
improvements on the husband's separate property. Is it to be presumed
that she makes a gift to him of her interest in such community property,
as is true where the husband improves the wife's separate property? Logically, it might well be argued that the result should be the same." However, in any situation where a transaction occurs between the spouses which
benefits the husband to the detriment of the wife, it is usual in California
to presume that constructively a fraud has been practiced on the wife and
the burden is imposed on the husband to disprove or rebut this presumption by showing that he explained fully to the wife the result or effect of
the transaction and that she understood it fully." The same rule might be
applied by the California courts in the situation of the wife as manager
using community funds to improve separate property of the husband.
One of the matters arising from the situation of using community funds
to improve separate property of a spouse, and in California especially the
improvement of separate property of the wife, is that such funds may be
property which was subject to the claims of creditors. Particularly, if the
use of such funds by the husband as managing spouse leaves him with insufficient funds to meet his obligations, his use of the funds to improve
separate property which may not be liable to such obligations may be in
fraud of the rights of creditors.32 In Washington or any state which recognizes that the community has a lien on the separate property to insure reimbursement, such lien is an asset of the community of which a creditor
may be entitled to avail himself.3 However, even in the absence of recognition of a lien, certainly the community interest in the property should
be reachable by creditors. There is recognition of this principle, at least.
In conclusion, it may be remarked that despite the numerous cases in
the field, there are a number of situations as to which there is not as yet
any case law directly in point. It is necessary, then, to speculate as to the
29

Walsh v. Walsh, 56 Cal. App. 2d 801, 133 P.2d 416 (1943).
30 See Odone v. Marzocchi, supra note 13.
31 For the rule as to full and fair disclosure by a husband to his wife in transactions between them, see Estate of Brimhall, 62 Cal. App. 2d 30, 143 P.2d 981 (1943).
32 Peck v. Brummagim, supra note 1; Bank of Orofino v. Wellman, supra note 27; see
also, Nichols v. Mitchell, 32 Cal. 2d 598, 197 P.2d 550 (1948).
33 Conley v. Moe, supra note 9. See also, Eckley v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 30 Wash. 2d
96, 190 P.2d 718 (1948).
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answer that will be applied, as can be seen above. In course of time, no
doubt these questions will be solved. And to repeat, it is to be hoped that
the District Court of Appeals decisions will more often accord with those
of the Supreme Court and that both courts will amplify on the equities and
equitable remedies available.

